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COMMENT
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS V BECK: SUPREME COURT
THROWS UNIONS OUT ON STREET
INTRODUCTION

In 1976, twenty non-union employees of American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T") filed suit against their exclusive bargaining
representative, Communications Workers of America ("CWA"), challenging CWA's use of their agency fees for non-collective bargaining
purposes.'
As part of the collective bargaining agreement in effect between AT&T

and CWA, non-union employees were required to tender to CWA initia-

tion fees and dues in amounts equivalent to members' fees and dues 2-- an
arrangement known as an agency shop.3 The non-union employees objected to CWA's expenditure of these agency fees for purposes other than
collective bargaining, such as lobbying for labor legislation, organizing
the employees of other employers, and participating in social, charitable
and political events.' They alleged that such expenditures violated sec-

tion 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 5 CWA's

duty of fair representation, 6 and the first amendment. 7 The employees
1. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2645 (1988).
2. See id.; see also Reilly, The Constitutionalityof Labor Unions' Collection and Use
of Forced Dues for Non-BargainingPurposes, 32 Mercer L. Rev. 561, 569 n.69 (1981)
(reproducing text of agency shop agreement between CWA and AT&T).
3. The agency and union shops are different types of union security agreements. A
union security agreement has been defined as a "contract[] between a labor union and an
employer whereby the employer agrees to require his employees, as a condition of their
employment, to affiliate with the union in some way." T. Haggard, Compulsory Unionism, the NLRB, and the Courts 4 (1977).
Under a union shop, this required affiliation takes the form of formal union membership. Under an agency shop, the affiliation is merely the payment of initiation fees and
periodic dues to the union. See id.
4. See Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2645.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
permits an employer and an exclusive bargaining representative to enter into an agency
shop agreement whereby all employees in the bargaining unit must pay periodic union
dues and initiation fees as a condition of continued employment, whether or not they
wish to become union members. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734
(1963).
Under a 1980 addition to the NLRA, employees with religious objections to unions
may make a contribution equivalent to union dues to a nonlabor, nonreligious, tax-exempt charity. See National Labor Relations Act Amendment of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96593, 94 Stat. 3452 (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1982)).
6. A union's duty of fair representation is implied from § 9(a) of the NLRA, which
grants unions exclusive representational status over members of the relevant bargaining
unit. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 336-38 (1953). This duty requires
that the union "serve the interests of all [employees] without hostility or discrimination
toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid
arbitrary conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
The non-union employees in Beck asserted that CWA breached its duty of fair repre-
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sought an injunction barring CWA from collecting agency fees above
those necessary to pay for collective bargaining activities.8
This dispute reached the United States Supreme Court in 1988. The
Court, in Communications Workers v. Beck, 9 held that section 8(a)(3) of

the NLRA authorizes unions to collect only those agency fees germane
to collective bargaining activities.1 0 According to this holding, section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA does not permit a union, over the objections of
nonmembers, to expend funds collected from them on activities unrelated to collective bargaining. By finding a statutory limit on union expenditures, the Court avoided addressing possible limits imposed by the
Constitution and by the duty of fair representation."

This Comment analyzes the Beck decision and concludes that the
Court's interpretation of section 8(a)(3) was flawed. Part I reviews the
case history of Beck and the Supreme Court's decision, and criticizes
Beck for failing to follow the Supreme Court's established method of
statutory construction. Part I then examines the language and legislative

history of section 8(a)(3). Part II examines the constitutional issue
avoided by the Beck Court: whether union expenditure of nonmembers'

agency fees for political and other non-collective bargaining purposes violates the nonmembers' freedom of speech rights. This Comment concludes that Congress did not intend section 8(a)(3) to forbid all noncollective bargaining expenditures of monies collected pursuant to union
security agreements authorized by that statute, and that the absence of
state action in an agency shop agreement renders invalid the first amend-

ment claims of objecting nonmembers.
sentation by spending compelled agency fees for purposes that the employees found objectionable. See Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2645.
No breach of the duty of fair representation occurs when a union expends agency fees
on political activities. See Price v. International Union, 795 F.2d 1128, 1135 (2d Cir.
1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2890 (1988) (vacated and remanded in light of Beck). But see
Beck v. Communications Workers, 800 F.2d 1280, 1286-88 (4th Cir. 1986) (en bane)
(Murnaghan, J., concurring) (expenditure of agency fees on political activities breaches
duty), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988). First, a union's expenditure of agency fees on political activities does not necessarily involve arbitrary or dishonest conduct by the union.
Second, expenditures on political activities may benefit nonmembers and members alike.
See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. Indeed, in § 8(a)(3), Congress fixed the
nonmembers' fee for union representation as the equivalent of regular union dues-fully
cognizant of the union practice of using those dues for non-collective bargaining activities. See Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 61, 80
(1983). The duty of fair representation reflects the notion that the exclusive bargaining
representative should "exercise [its] power in [the represented employees'] interest and
behalf." Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). A union's expenditure
of agency fees on political activities fits this description.
7. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
8. See Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2645.
9. 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988).
10. See id. at 2657.
11. See id. at 2656-57.
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I. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS V. BECK
A.

The Circuitous Path to the Supreme Court

The district court decided Beck on constitutional grounds. Although
the opinion contained no analysis or explanation, the court found that
CWA's collection of agency fees for non-collective bargaining purposes3
12
violated the first amendment rights of the objecting nonmembers.1
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that
CWA's expenditure of agency fees for purposes unrelated to collective
bargaining violated both NLRA section 8(a)(3) and the union's duty of
fair representation. 4 Though it rested its decision on statutory grounds,
thereby removing any constitutional implications, the court opined in
dictum that sufficient government action existed to give rise to first
amendment claims.1 5 In a better reasoned analysis, however, Chief
Judge Winter dissented, concluding that section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
authorized the collection of agency fees from nonmembers in amounts
equivalent to full union dues.' 6 Judge Winter further noted that because
agency shop agreements involve only private conduct, they are incapable
17
of violating the first amendment rights of objecting nonmembers.
B.

The Supreme Court Decision

When Beck reached the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, relied on a curious method of statutory interpretation to
reach the conclusion that section 8(a)(3) limits the uses to which a union
may put its agency fees. The Supreme Court's well settled method of
statutory construction entails examining, in order, first the language and
then the legislative history of the statute.1 8 In Beck, however, the Court
looked outside the statute entirely. The Court worked backwards: instead of beginning with the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
("LMRA"), 19 which added section 8(a)(3) to the NLRA, the Court began its analysis with the 1951 amendments of the Railway Labor Act
("RLA"), 20 which governs labor relations in the railroad and airline in12. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
13. See Beck v. Communications Workers, 468 F. Supp. 93 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd on
other grounds, 776 F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en
bane) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988).
14. Beck, 776 F.2d at 1209.
15. See id. at 1205. On rehearing en banc, the court, in a short per curiam opinion,
voted six-to-four to sustain federal jurisdiction, and affirmed the majority panel opinion
below. See id. at 1280.
16. See id. at 1214-15 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
17. See id. at 1214.
18. See, eg., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983); Dickerson v. New

Banner Institute, 460 U.S. 103, 110 (1983); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
19. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29.U.S.C. § 151-169 (1982)).

20. Ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238, 1238-39 (1951) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982)).
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dustries, and worked its way back to the statute under consideration,

section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
Specifically, the Court concluded that InternationalAssociation of Ma22
chinists v. Street,2 1 which interpreted section 2, Eleventh of the RLA,
controlled the interpretation of NLRA section 8(a)(3) since both provisions are "in all material respects identical."' 23 The Court reasoned that
because Street had interpreted section 2, Eleventh of the RLA as prohibiting a union from expending agency fees on political causes,24 and because Congress, when it amended the RLA in 1951, intended to give

railroad employees the same rights that industrial employees enjoyed
under section 8(a)(3), Congress in 1947 must have intended section
8(a)(3) to authorize the assessment of only those agency fees germane to
collective bargaining.2 5
Using this contorted reasoning, the Court was able to interpret section
8(a)(3) without analyzing its language or legislative history. The real issue, however, is the language and legislative history of section 8(a)(3)what the Eightieth Congress intended that statute to mean. What the
Eighty-first Congress intended in section 2, Eleventh of the RLA or what

it thought the Eightieth Congress intended in enacting section 8(a)(3) is
largely irrelevant.2 6 As Justice Blackmun stated in his dissent to Beck,

21. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
22. Section 2, Eleventh of the RLA provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or
law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or
carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with
the requirements of this chapter shall be permitted(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment,
that within sixty days following the beginning of such employment... all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft
or class: Provided,That no such agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not available upon
the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other member
or with respect to employees to whom membership was denied or terminated
for any reason other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic
dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
23. Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2648 (1988).
24. See id. at 2648-49 (citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 770 (1961)).
25. Id.
26. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) ("it is well settled that 'the
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one' ") (quoting Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories,
460 U.S. 150, 165 n.27 (1983)).
Furthermore, the language and legislative history of § 2, Eleventh do not clearly support Street's holding that the statute prohibits union expenditures of agency fees on political causes. See Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional
Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 Rutgers L. Rev. 3, 41-44 (1983); Cantor,
supra note 6, at 75. As Justice Brennan himself admitted in an earlier decision, "Street
embraced an interpretation of the [RLA] not without its difficulties precisely to avoid
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"[w]ithout the decision in Machinists v. Street ... the Court could not
reach the result it does today. Our accepted mode of resolving statutory

questions would not lead to a construction of § 8(a)(3) so foreign to that
section's express language and legislative history .

"..."27An

examina-

tion of the language and legislative history of section 8(a)(3) reveals that
Congress did not intend to limit either the amount of agency fees a union
may collect or the uses to which a union may put such funds.
C. Statutory and Legislative History Analysis of Section 8(a)(3)

In 1947, the Labor-Management Relations Act added section 8(a)(3)

to the NLRA. z8 Section 8(a)(3) replaced the original section 8(3) of the
NLRA,2 9 which had permitted unions and employers to enter into closed
shop agreements requiring employers to hire only persons who were already union members.30
Section 8(a)(3) embodies a twofold congressional purpose. First, Congress intended to end the abuses associated with compulsory unionism by

eliminating unions' power over entry into the job market, and by insulat-

ing job status against changes in union membership status.3' Second,
Congress sought to avoid the "free-rider" problem: in the absence of a
union security agreement, the non-union employees
reap the benefits of
32
union representation without sharing in its cost.
Two provisos of section 8(a)(3) are relevant. 33 The first authorizes em-

facing the constitutional issues presented by the use of union-shop dues for political and
ideological purposes. .. ." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
27. Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2657-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
28. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 140-41 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982)).
29. The original section 8(3) provided in pertinent part:
[N]othing in this Act ... or in any other statute of the United States, shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization...
to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees.., in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made.
NLRA, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (repealed 1947).
30. See Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355 (1949).
31. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, at 407, 412-13 (1985)
[hereinafter 1 NLRB]; 93 Cong. Rec. 1891, 4558-59, 5086-87 (1947), reprinted in 2
NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, at 952-53,
1199, 1417, 1419-20_(1985) [hereinafter 2 NLRB].
Prior to 1947, unions abused closed shop agreements by arbitrarily preventing individuals from obtaining employment by refusing union membership, as well as causing workers to lose their jobs by expelling them from the union without justification. See T.
Haggard, supra note 3, at 36.
32. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 7 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, supra
note 31, at 412-13; 93 Cong. Rec. 4887 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft); see also NLRB v.
General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1963).
33. Section 8(a)(3) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(3)

by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
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ployers and unions to enter into agreements requiring all employees to
become union members within thirty days after being hired. 4 The second prohibits mandatory discharge of an employee for nonmembership if
either, under Part A, membership was not available to the employee "on
the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members," 35

or, under Part B, membership "was denied or terminated for reasons
other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the

initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining

membership." 6 Section 8(a)(3) therefore banned the closed shop, authorizing in its place a less onerous form of union security agreement.3 7

The exact nature of this less onerous form of union security agreement,
however, was the subject of some confusion."
In 1963, the Supreme Court ended this confusion by ruling, in NLRB
v. General Motors Corp., 9 that section 8(a)(3) authorizes the agency
shop. It reached this conclusion by construing "membership," upon
which employment can be conditioned, to mean only the payment of
dues, rather than formal union membership. 4' By finding that section
8(a)(3) did not authorize the union shop, the Court shifted the constitutional inquiry. After GeneralMotors, it was no longer necessary to assess
the constitutional implications of mandatory union membership. The
question remained, however, whether union expenditure of nonmembers'
agency fees for political and other non-collective bargaining purposes violates the nonmembers' freedom of speech rights.
The Court in Beck similarly avoided the constitutional issue. This
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other
statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization... to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment ....

Providedfurther, That no employer shall justify any discrimi-

nation against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to
the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other
members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership
was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ....

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id.

37. The requirement in § 8(a)(3) that employees affiliate with the union in some fashion was looked on as a small sacrifice necessary to the fiscal health of unions, and incidental to the achievement ofjob security. Senator Taft, a co-sponsor of the LMRA, reflected
the view of Congress when he stated "[t]he fact that the employee will have to pay dues to
the union seems.., to be much less important. The important thing is that the man will
have the job." See 93 Cong. Rec. 4886 (1947).
38. See T. Haggard, supra note 3, at 34.
39. 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
40. See id. at 740-44.
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time, however, the Court stretched section 8(a)(3) beyond its breaking
point-transgressing, in the process, its own doctrine that, in avoiding
constitutional questions, the Court may not embrace a statutory construction that "is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 4 1 In Beck,

the Court adopted a construction of section 8(a)(3) that is inconsistent
with the congressional intent expressed in the statutory language and legislative history.
To begin with, the language4 2 and legislative history43 of section
8(a)(3) support a union security agreement more onerous than the
agency shop. 4' The plain language of section 8(a)(3) requires union
"membership," and the debates over the statute made no mention of the
41. Edward J.DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988).
42. Congress chose not to authorize explicitly the agency shop in § 8(a)(3). Indeed,
§ 8(a)(3) authorizes union security agreements requiring union "membership" within 30
days after being hired, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), and the essence of the agency
shop is that union membership is not required.
Moreover, the structure of § 8(a)(3) does not support the agency shop interpretation of
that statute, for the agency shop interpretation renders part A of the second proviso
redundant. Under the agency shop interpretation, the "membership" upon which employment is conditioned is merely the payment of periodic dues and initiation fees to the
union. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). Part B of the
second proviso prohibits mandatory discharge for nonmembership if membership is denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to pay periodic dues
and initiation fees to the union. Thus, part A of the second proviso, which prohibits
mandatory discharge for nonmembership if the union abused its membership criteria, is
unnecessary.
43. See 93 Cong. Rec. 4886 ("[u]nder [§ 8(a)(3),] the closed shop is abolished, and a
man can get a job with an employer and can continue in that job if... he joins the union
and pays the union dues") (remarks of Sen. Taft) (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, supra note 31, at 412-13; H.R.
Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, supra note 31, at 300;
Cantor, supra note 6, at 72; Hopfl, The Agency Shop Question, 49 Cornell L.Q. 478, 484
(1964). Despite hearing testimony on the agency shop, see id., Congress never explicitly
discussed the idea. See Stanner, Legality of Agency Shop Contracts Under the National
Labor Relations Act and the Effect of "Right to, Work" Laws on Such Union Security
Provisions, 52 Ill. B.J. 247, 251 n.21 (1963) ("Senator Taft's comment on § 8(a)(3) is
perhaps the nearest thing to a remark about the agency shop to be found in the legislative
history."). To the contrary, Congress primarily focused on the problems associated with
compulsory, formal union membership, see 93 Cong. Rec. 4858-77, 4885-87 (1947); see
also Hopfl, supra, at 484. This supports the theory that Congress had some form of union
shop in mind when enacting § 8(a)(3).
44. Congress apparently intended § 8(a)(3) to authorize a variation of the union shop.
Congress called the union security agreement authorized in § 8(a)(3) a "union shop." See
H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, supra note 31,
at 321; 93 Cong. Rec. 5079-80 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 31, at 1405.
Indeed, the first proviso of § 8(a)(3) expressly authorizes a union shop. However, part B
of the second proviso insulates members who are expelled from the uniori against termination of employment so long as they continue to tender union dues. This transforms the
union security agreement authorized in § 8(a)(3) into a variation of the traditional union
shop, for in a genuine union shop a worker expelled from the union loses his job.
Under this variation, an employee must apply for membership in his exclusive bargaining representative and accept a subsequent invitation to join. Workers who are initially
refused membership, and those who are accepted but subsequently expelled from the
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agency shop, instead focusing on compulsory membership.45 Therefore,
it is erroneous to conclude that Congress intended section 8(a)(3) to limit
the amounts of agency fees unions may collect and the uses to which they
may put them.
Furthermore, even if one assumes that Congress intended section
8(a)(3) to authorize only the agency shop, the statutory language and
legislative history of the LMRA reveal that Congress did not intend section 8(a)(3) to prevent all non-collective bargaining-related expenditures
by unions of the monies collected from employees pursuant to authorized
union security agreements.
1. The Statutory Language
The plain language of section 8(a)(3) authorizes union security agreements under which unions can collect from any employee the "periodic
dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership."" The statute contains no mention of lesser
"dues" and "fees" that nonmember employees covered by a union security agreement may be required to pay their exclusive bargaining representative. Furthermore, as the dissent in Beck pointed out, section 8(a)(3)
does not address the uses to which a union may put the monies collected
pursuant to a union security agreement. 4 7
The Beck Court explained away section 8(a)(3)'s silence4 ' with two
arguments. The Court first noted that, in Street, it had attached no significance to RLA section 2, Eleventh's silence concerning the permissible
uses of agency fees, and now saw no reason to give greater weight to
congressional silence in section 8(a)(3). 4 9 However, as the dissent aptly
pointed out, the Court's "answer" to the absolute lack of evidence that
Congress intended to regulate agency fee expenditures "is no answer at
all." 5 0 When finding an implicit limitation in a statute, the Court's task
is not to weigh silence, but to find some support for its proposition."1
The Court's second explanation for this silence was that explicitly
union cannot be discharged for nonmembership by the employer so long as they tender
periodic dues and initiation fees to the union. See T. Haggard, supra note 3, at 37.
45. See Hopfl, supra note 43, at 484.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (198-2) (emphasis added).
47. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2660-61 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 2656 (opinion of the Court).
49. The Court stated:
Congress was equally aware of the same practices by railway unions... yet
neither in Street nor in any of the cases that followed it have we deemed Congress' failure in § 2, Eleventh to prohibit.., such expenditures as an endorsement of fee collections unrelated to collective bargaining expenses. We see no
reason to give greater weight to Congress' silence in the NLRA than we did in
the RLA .... I
Id. (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 2661 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. See id.
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prohibiting non-collective bargaining expenditures of agency fees would
have been redundant since Congress understood section 8(a)(3) "to enable unions to charge nonmembers only for those activities that actually
benefit them."52 This rationale begs the question because non-collective
bargaining expenditures can benefit nonmembers. Many of the employment-related benefits provided by unions are obtained through the political arena.5 3 Items secured through legislative lobbying, such as pension

plans and occupational health and safety measures, all benefit dues-paying employees as much as if they had been secured from the employer.
Thus, by limiting compelled agency fees to contract negotiation and
administration expenses, Beck resurrected the "free rider" problem that
section 8(a)(3) was designed to prevent. When a union secures an employment-related benefit, all represented employees benefit. This is true
whether the benefit is secured through the political arena or at the bargaining table. If a represented employee enjoys the benefit without con-

tributing to its cost, he is a free rider. Represented employees who enjoy
the benefits derived from political expenditures without contributing to

their cost are no less free riders than those who fail to financially support
the benefits
derived from contract negotiation and administration
54
expenses.
2.

The Legislative History

The legislative history of the LMRA also reveals that Congress did not

intend to limit unions' use of fees. Congress was well aware of labor

unions' use of the political arena to obtain workers' benefits,5" and acknowledged that through such expenditures, the American worker
"ha[d] been compelled to contribute to causes and candidates for public
office to which he was opposed." 56 In response, Congress explicitly considered proposed provisions limiting labor unions' spending of dues and
fees for non-collective bargaining purposes.5 7 Congress, however, chose
52. Id. at 2656 (opinion of the Court).
53. See Cantor, supra note 6, at 75; Gaebler, Union PoliticalActivity or Collective
Bargaining?FirstAmendment Limitationson the Uses of Union Shop Funds, 14 U.C.D.L.
Rev. 591, 601-02 (1981).
54. See Cantor, supra note 6, at 75; Gaebler, supra note 53, at 603.
55. See United States.v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1957); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, supra note 31, at 295.
56. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra
note 31, at 295.
57. For instance, the original House bill contained a "bill of rights" for workers. See
H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-33 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, supra note
31, at 322-24. Within this proposed "bill of rights" was a provision declaring that
"[m]embers of any labor organization shall have the right to be free from unreasonable
... financial demands of such organization," H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §.7(b)
(1947), reprintedin I NLRB, supra note 31, at 49, as well as a provision that Representative Hartley described as allowing a worker "to decide for himself whether or not his
money will be spent for political purposes." 93 Cong. Rec. 3425 (1947) (statement of
Rep. Hartley). The Senate, despite hearing testimony on the danger of failing to limit
uses of dues to be collected by unions pursuant to the union security agreements being
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to add only section 304 to the LMRA.5 8 Section 304 merely prohibits
unions from using employees' dues for federal elections,5 9 while leaving
unions free to use dues for lobbying purposes and for political campaigns
outside of federal elections. This Congressional refusal to place limits on
the uses to which a union could put dues compels the conclusion that
Congress did not intend section 8(a)(3) to forbid all non-collective bargaining expenditures of monies collected through union security
agreements.
The Beck Court dismissed this argument as "misplaced" because these
more stringent proposals did not concern the rights of nonmembers who
are compelled to pay union dues, but rather applied only to union members.6 0 As previously noted, however, Congress did not explicitly discuss
the agency shop dues-paying nonmember; it was compulsory membership that received the greatest deliberation.6 But even if the term "membership" in section 8(a)(3) means only the payment of dues, as the
Supreme Court said it does,6 2 then surely the "member" sought to be
protected in the more stringent proposals included the dues-paying
employee.
The House Committee on Education and Labor Report accompanying
the more stringent proposals reveals this to be the case, because the Committee recognized the increased importance of the proposals in light of
the authorization of union security agreements requiring union "membership."6 If the dues-paying employee is a union "member," as the
Supreme Court ruled in General Motors,' then the more stringent proposals were not limited in scope to voluntary union members, as the Beck
authorized, see Beck v. Communications Workers, 776 F.2d 1187, 1215 (4th Cir. 1985)
(Winter, C.J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en
banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988), refused to agree to the House's proposed "bill of
rights" provisions. See 93 Cong. Rec. 6436 (1947).
58. LMRA, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60 (1947). Section 304 was repealed by
§ 201(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90
Stat. 475, 496 (1976), and replaced by § 112(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 486-490 (1976) (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 441b (1982)). Section 441b prohibits the use of agency fees by unions in connection with federal elections. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
59. See 93 Cong. Rec. 6440 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft).
60. See Beck, 108 S.Ct. at 2655.
61. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
62. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1963).
63. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra
note 31, at 322, provides:
Having given to unions great power over workers, we now make sure that the
unions will operate democratically, that they will use their powers in the interest of the workers, and that those that heretofore have exploited the workers no
longer can do so. The permitting ... of agreements between employers and
labor organizations requiring union membership makes this bill of rights of
even greaterimportance than would be the case ifunion membership were, in all
respects, entirely voluntary.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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Court contended, but rather protected all employees bound by a union
security agreement authorized by section 8(a)(3). Ironically, Beck's revision of section 8(a)(3) was unnecessary, for the constitutional implications are rendered moot by the absence of state action.

II.

ABSENCE OF STATE ACTION IN AGENCY SHOP AGREEMENTS

Because a proper interpretation of section 8(a)(3) permits unions to
collect agency fees from nonmembers in amounts equal to regular union

dues, and does not place any restrictions on the uses to which unions
may put these fees, the statute raises the constitutional issue whether a
union's expenditure of agency fees on political activities violates the first
amendment rights of the objecting nonmembers.6 5
Although there is disagreement on this issue,6 6 it is here suggested that
such an expenditure cannot violate the objecting nonmembers' first
amendment rights because an agency shop agreement by a union and an

employer does not involve government action.
A.

The State Action Requirement

By its terms, the first amendment proscribes only government action,
not the action of private individuals.6 7 This distinction gave rise to the
"state action" doctrine: challenged conduct is subject to constitutional
65. The exact nature of the first amendment interests involved in the agency shop
scenario is the subject of some confusion. It is not the freedom of association-that first
amendment interest is implicated only in the closed shop and union shop situations where
formal union membership is compulsory. Nor is it the traditional freedom of speech, for
the objecting nonmembers claim the right not to speak.
Justice Stewart, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 222-23 (1977),
characterized the right of freedom of belief as the first amehdment interest implicated
when a non-union employee is compelled to financially support the union. However,
some commentators disagree. See Cantor, supra note 26, at 71; Gaebler, FirstAmendment ProtectionsAgainst Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C.L.
Rev. 995, 1003 (1982).
66. Compare Price v. International Union, 795 F.2d 1128, 1133 (2d Cir. 1986) (no
state action), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2890 (1988) and Beck v. Communications Workers, 776
F.2d 1187, 1221-25 (4th Cir. 1985) (Winter, C.J., dissenting) (same), aff'd on other
grounds, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2641
(1988) and Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same) and Reid v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 410-11 (10th Cir. 1971) (same) and Linscott v.
Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1971) (Coffin, J., concurring) (same) and
Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953) (same), aff'd, 229 F.2d 919
(1956) with Beck, 776 F.2d at 1205 (finding state action) and Hammond v. United Papermakers, 462 F.2d 174, 175 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972) and
Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1971) (same) and Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 1970) (same) and Lykins v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 510 F. Supp. 21, 25-26 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (same) and Havas v.
Communications Workers, 509 F. Supp. 144, 148-49 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (same).
67. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978); Abood v. Detroit
Bd, of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226-27 & n.23 (1977); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513
(1976); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114
(1973); U.S. Const. amend. I.
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scrutiny only if it entails governmental action. 8 The Supreme Court has
put forth many "tests" for determining the existence of state action. 9

These state action tests, however, have virtually no analytical utility, for
they contain broad language that can support both sides of a state action
controversy. Thus, as the Supreme Court itself has stated, "[o]nly by

sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement
'70
of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."
B. Absence of State Action in Section 8(a)(3)
An agency shop agreement is a contract between two private partieslabor and management 71-which, standing alone, represents the product
of purely private action. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA is permissive,72
and as such, does not sufficiently infuse the federal government into this
private relationship to constitute state action.7 3 Section 8(a)(3) simply
provides that federal law does not preclude employers and their employees' bargaining representatives from entering into agency shop agreements.7 4 Thus, section 8(a)(3) does not compel an employer and a union
to adopt an agency shop agreement, or any other form of union security,
as part of their collective bargaining agreement.
Two other provisions of the NLRA reinforce section 8(a)(3)'s permissiveness. Under section 14(b)," section 8(a)(3) does not preempt state
laws banning the agency shop,7 6 but merely authorizes agency shop
agreements in the absence of state law proscriptions. 77 Accordingly, sec68. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
69. See, e.g., Lugar,457 U.S. at 937; Flagg Bro&, 436 U.S. at 157; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
170 (1970); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
70. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); accord Kolinske
v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Glennon & Nowak, A FunctionalAnalysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 221,
222; T. Haggard, supra note 3, at 244.
71. See T. Haggard, supra note 3, at 239.
72. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 2644-45 (1988) (section
8(a)(3) "permits" an employer and union to enter into an agency shop agreement).
73. See Price v. International Union, 795 F.2d 1128, 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated, 108
S. Ct. 2890 (1988); Beck v. Communications Workers, 776 F.2d 1187, 1221-25 (4th Cir.
1985) (Winter, C.J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S.Ct. 2641 (1988); Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 476
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 410-411 (10th Cir.
1971); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1971) (Coffin, J., concurring); Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953), aff'd, 229 F.2d 919
(1956).
74. See 29 U.S.C. §'158(a)(3) (1982).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982).
76. Twenty-one states have enacted laws allowing employees to withhold payment of
union dues. See W. Gould, A Primer on American Labor Law 50-51 (2d ed. 1986).
77. Section 14(b) states: "Nothing in this subehapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982).
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tion 8(a)(3)'s authorization of agency shop agreements is contingent not
only upon the whim of the employer and union to adopt an agency shop
agreement, but also upon the discretion of the particular state to decline
to proscribe agency shop agreements.7 8
Section 8(d) 79 of the NLRA also illustrates section 8(a)(3)'s permis-

siveness. Section 8(d) announces the NLRA's neutrality with respect to
the contents of collective bargaining agreements.8" The NLRA does not
mandate the existence or content of any provision of a collective bargaining agreement, including an agency shop clause. The employer and
union are free to include or omit an agency shop clause from their collective bargaining agreement, again subject only to the discretion of the

78. In addition to demonstrating the permissive nature of § 8(a)(3), § 14(b) provides
the crucial distinction between § 8(a)(3) and its parallel provision, § 2, Eleventh of the
Railway Labor Act. In Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
(1956), the Court held that the RLA's authorization of agency shop agreements involved
government action, id. at 232, basing its decision solely upon § 2, Eleventh's preemption
of state law prohibiting agency shop agreements. See id. This same basis for finding
government action does not appear in the NLRA, however, because NLRA § 14(b) mandates that the statute's authorization of agency shop agreements yield to contrary state
law. The notion underlying Hanson that the federal law, by overriding conflicting state
laws, became the "source of the power and authority" for agency shop agreements is
absent in the context of the NLRA. As one court phrased it:
By authorizing the inclusion of [agency] shop clauses subject to the whim of the
states, the NLRA allows private parties to do nothing more than what they
could have agreed to do without the NLRA. The RLA, on the other hand, goes
further and creates a federal right or privilege that enables private parties to
override state.., laws.
Price v. International Union, 795 F.2d 1128, 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2890
(1988); accord Beck v. Communications Workers, 776 F.2d 1187, 1223-24 (4th Cir.
1985) (Winter, C.J., dissenting), aff'd on othergrounds, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988); Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 476
(D.C. Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court itself has noted the absence of this preemption
feature from the NLRA. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 218 n.12
(1977); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 n.5 (1956).
Courts and commentators, however, do not agree that this is a distinction with a difference for state action purposes. Compare, eg., Price, 795 F.2d at 1132-33 (holding that
§ 14(b) distinguishes NLRA from RLA and renders Hanson inapplicable) and Beck, 776
F.2d at 1224 (Winter, C.J., dissenting) (same) and Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 476 (same) and
Hovan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 704 F.2d 641, 643 (1st Cir. 1983) (same) and T.
Haggard, supra note 3, at 241 (regarding state action issue in relation to NLRA, "the
Hanson theory would appear to be inapplicable") with Beck, 776 F.2d at 1206 (difference
has no relevance) and Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1971) (same)
and Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1970) (assuming
Hanson applies to NLRA) and Havas v. Communications Workers, 509 F. Supp. 144,
148-49 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding Hanson applies to NLRA) and Reilly, supra note 2, at
561-63 (assuming Hanson applies to NLRA).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
80. Section 8(d) states in pertinent part:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to... the negotiation of an agreement.., but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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state.8 1 Taken together, sections 8(a)(3), 14(b) and 8(d) of the NLRA
reveal that the Act merely provides federal authorization of private conduct in negotiating and enforcing agency shop agreements. It is well settled by the Supreme Court, however, that the government's
authorization of private conduct, without anything more, is not sufficient
to constitute state action. 2 Thus, the NLRA's authorization of agency
shop agreements does not convert the adoption of an agency shop agreement by private parties into state action.8 3
Although the agency shop agreement is entered into by private parties,
some courts8 4 and commentators8 5 argue that one of the private partiesthe union-does not act in a private capacity. This theory8 6 for finding
state action in agency shop agreements stems from Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co.,8 7 which is often cited in support of the theory: "Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers
comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and
restrict the rights of those whom it represents ...."I'
According to this theory, a union's ability to collect dues from employees who are not, and do not wish to become, union members flows from
Congress' grant to unions of the right of exclusive representation in sec81. In this respect, the NLRA's policy of neutrality regarding the contents of collec-.
tive bargaining agreements distinguishes it from public sector collective bargaining, and,
therefore, from Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Abood
Court, in a plurality opinion, found without discussion that an agency shop agreement
contained in a public employment contract involved state action. See id. at 226 n.23.
The Court's brevity is not surprising, however, because all aspects of public employment
necessarily involve government action; the employer is the government. Accordingly,
Abood's finding of state action in a public sector agency shop agreement has no relevance
to the private sector and the NLRA. See Beck v. Communications Workers, 776 F.2d
1187, 1225 (4th Cir. 1985) (Winter, C.J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 800 F.2d
1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988); Kolinske v.
Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
82. See, eg., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357
(1974).
83. See Price v. International Union, 795 F.2d 1128, 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated, 108
S. Ct. 2890 (1988); Beck, 776 F.2d at 1222 (Winter, C.J., dissenting); Kolinske, 712 F.2d
at 478.
84. See Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 419 U.S. 1093,
1094-95 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Beck, 776 F.2d at 1207.
85. See T. Haggard, supra note 3, at 247 ("[a]rguably .... the statutory grant of the

right of exclusive representation ...necessarily involves the exercise of powers normally
reserved to the sovereign; that whenever, pursuant to this delegation of authority, the
union acts in its representative capacity, this is'state action' "); Summers, Union Powers
and Workers' Rights, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 805, 811 (1951).
86. This theory is considered "the leading theoretical justification for raising constitutional issues within the context of ostensibly private collective bargaining agreements."
T. Haggard, supra note 3, at 247.
87. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
88. Id. at 202 (citation omitted). Although Steele dealt with the Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. § 151-64 (1982), its imposition of the duty of fair representation upon railway
unions has been extended to unions subject to the NLRA. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
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tion 9(a) of the NLRA. 9 Section 9(a) gives a union receiving a majority
of votes from within a proper bargaining unit the right to make a collective bargaining agreement with the employer that is binding on all employees, including those who did not vote for the union.90 Thus, the
NLRA "extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own
relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen
representative to act in the interests of all employees."' Proponents of
this theory argue that section 9(a)'s grant of exclusive representation and
section 8(a)(3)'s authorization of agency shop
agreements, taken to92
gether, transform the union into a state actor.
This theory9 3 has a superficial appeal, in view of the extensive federal
regulation of labor unions. 94 While the federal government's grant of
exclusive representation and requirement that employers bargain over
union security agreements9 5 might make it easier for unions to secure
89. Section 9(a) states in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purp6ses of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
90. See id.
91. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
92. See, e.g., Beck v. Communications Workers, 776 F.2d 1187, 1207 (4th Cir. 1985),
aff'd on other grounds, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S.
Ct. 2641 (1988); Reilly, supra note 2, at 563.
93. The essence of the theory is that state action exists because exclusive representation is akin to a governmental grant of monopoly power. Yet in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Supreme Court held that even government-conferred monopoly power is insufficient to create state action. See id. at 358. Many courts
that find no state action in § 8(a)(3) correctly cite Jackson for that proposition. See, eg.,
Price v. International Union, 795 F.2d 1128, 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2890
(1988); Beck, 776 F.2d at 1222 (Winter, C.J., dissenting); Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d
471, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
94. Those who would transform the union into a state actor also point to the extensive federal regulation of labor unions, including the federal labor contract enforcement
machinery in § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). However, it is well settled
that federal regulation of a private entity does not, in and of itself, create state action.
See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830, 841-42 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950); Kolinske v. Lubbers,
712 F.2d 471, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nor does the federal labor contract enforcement
machinery create state action. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200
(1979).
95. Some proponents of this theory additionally cite the inclusion of union security
within the mandatory subjects of bargaining listed in § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), as
creating state action. See Reilly, supra note 2, at 563. Under § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982), employers are required to bargain with unions over mandatory
subjects of bargaining. The argument is that this bargaining requirement in reality requires the inclusion of a union security provision in the collective bargaining agreement.
See Reilly, supra note 2, at 563. However, as noted above, the NLRA is neutral with
respect to the contents of collective bargaining agreements. The NLRA does not man-
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agency shop agreements and thus nonmembers' dues, 96 this is not suffi-

cient to label the union a state actor. The theory is fatally overbroad.
Congress' conferral of exclusive representation to unions underlies most
provisions in a collective bargaining agreement.
Yet the Constitution
97
does not apply to the terms of labor contracts.
Moreover, the principle of exclusive representation is implicated in virtually all interaction between the union and the nonmember employees it
represents. Therefore, if exclusive representation transformed the union
into a state actor, many union rules would be subject to constitutional
scrutiny. Yet this is not the case. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that union rules governed by the NLRA do not involve state action. 98 Congress' passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"),9 9 which contained a "Bill of Rights"
for union members," also proves that union rules are not subject to
constitutional scrutiny. Congress apparently believed that neither unions
nor their rules were subject to constitutional scrutiny-to the contrary,
Congress believed the LMRDA necessary to impose the obligations it
contains. 101
Furthermore, if a union's expenditure of agency fees on political activities involved state action, all unions would be state actors and their every
move would be subject to constitutional scrutiny. 102 This road is paved
with economic and political hazards"0 3 that Congress and the Supreme
Court have wisely avoided traveling.
date that a union security agreement be included in collective bargaining agreements,
only that the parties bargain over it in good faith.
96. See Beck v. Communications Workers, 776 F.2d 1187, 1222 (4th Cir. 1985) (Winter, C.J., dissenting), aff'd on othergrounds, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per
curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988); T. Haggard, supra note 3, at 242; Reilly, supra
note 2, at 563.
97. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 250 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Aldridge v. Boys, 98 Ill. App. 3d 803, 808, 424 N.E.2d 886, 889-90 (1981);
T. Haggard, supra note 3, at 247.
98. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
99. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 401531 (1982 & Supp. V 1986)).
100. Among those rights is § 101(a)(2), which "restate[s] a principal First Amendment
value-the right to speak one's mind without fear of reprisal." United Steelworkers v.
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982).
101. See Hovan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 704 F.2d 641, 643 (1st Cir. 1983).
102. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 252 n.7 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("If collective-bargaining agreements were subjected to the same constitutional constraints as federal rules and regulations, it would be difficult to find any stopping place in the constitutionalization of regulated private conduct.")
103. See id.; Hovan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 704 F.2d 641, 642-43 (1st Cir. 1983);
Cox, The Role ofLaw in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 620 (1959);
Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "GovernmentalAction", 70 Yale L.J.
345, 348-49 (1961).
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CONCLUSION

Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA authorizes unions to charge nonmembers
the equivalent of regular union dues and initiation fees for union representation. Congress did not place any limits on the uses to which unions
may put those dues. The Supreme Court's decision in Communications
Workers v. Beck, which construed section 8(a)(3) as prohibiting unions
from expending agency fees on non-collective bargaining activities, is
both erroneous and unnecessary. It is erroneous because there is no support in the language or legislative history of section 8(a)(3) for the
Court's reading of that statute, and unnecessary because the absence of
state action renders moot the first amendment claims of the objecting
nonmembers. Thus, Beck incorrectly impinges upon unions' efforts to
obtain job-related benefits through legislative lobbying and financial support of pro-labor candidates-efforts that are essential to effective representation in this country's government-regulated employment industry.
CharlesR. Virginia

